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Abstract. Data privacy protection studies how to query a dataset while preserving
the privacy of individuals whose sensitive information is contained in the dataset. The
information privacy model protects the privacy of an individual by using a noisy chan-
nel, called privacy channel, to filter out most information of the individual from the
query’s output.
This paper studies how to construct privacy channels, which is challenging since it needs
to evaluate the maximal amount of disclosed information of each individual contained
in the query’s output, called individual channel capacity. Our main contribution is an
interesting result which can transform the problem of evaluating a privacy channel’s
individual channel capacity, which equals the problem of evaluating the capacities of
an infinite number of channels, into the problem of evaluating the capacities of a finite
number of channels. This result gives us a way to utilize the results in the information
theory to construct privacy channels. As some examples, it is used to construct several
basic privacy channels, such as the random response privacy channel, the exponential
privacy channel and the Gaussian privacy channel, which are respective counterparts of
the random response mechanism, the exponential mechanism and the Gaussian mech-
anism of differential privacy.
Keywords: data privacy, differential privacy, privacy channel, Gaussian channel, channel capacity
1 Introduction
The field of data privacy protection [1,2,3] studies how to query a dataset while preserving the
privacy of individuals whose sensitive information is contained in the dataset. Since data privacy
is a fundamental problem in today’s information age, this field becomes more and more important.
The differential privacy model [4,5] is currently the most important and popular data privacy
protection model and has obtained great success both in the computer science communities [6,7]
and in the industry companies [8,9]. We reason that its success is strongly related to the feature
that its definition of privacy is irrelevant to the semantic meaning of data, which significantly
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separates it from many other privacy models, such as the k-anonymity [10], the ℓ-diversity [11]
or the t-closeness [12] model etc. Note that this feature is very similar to the one of Shannon’s
information theory which strips away the “semantic aspects” from the definition of information
[13,14]. The other important feature of the differential privacy model is the composition privacy
property, which makes it possible to modularly construct complex differentially private algorithms
from simple ones.
In spite of the big success of the differential privacy model, after a decade or so of study,
researchers, however, found that this model is vulnerable to those attacks where adversaries have
knowledge of the dependence among different records in the queried dataset [15]. Furthermore,
it seems that this model is not so flexible to provide satisfactory data utility [16], especially for
the unstructured data [17,18]. Therefore, many new privacy models are introduced to alleviate
the above two defects of the differential privacy model, such as the crowd-blending privacy model
[16], the Pufferfish model [19], the coupled-worlds privacy model [20], the zero-knowledge privacy
model [21], the inferential privacy model [22] and the information privacy model [23], etc. These
models in general are either more secure or more flexible in utility than the differential privacy
model. Especially, they all inherit the first feature of differential privacy mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. However, it seems that the second important feature of differential privacy, i.e. the
composition privacy property, is very hard to be inherited by these privacy models.
We are more interested in the information privacy model, a variant of Shannon’s information-
theoretic model of the encryption systems [24], since it has many interesting properties as the
differential privacy model, such as the post-processing invariance property [23], the group privacy
property and the composition privacy property [25]. Informally speaking, the information privacy
model protects privacy by using a noisy channel, called privacy channel or privacy mechanism, to
filter out most information of each individual from the query’s output. This model also assumes
that the entropy of each adversary’s probability distribution to the queried dataset is not so small.
This assumption is used to improve the data utility of query’s output, which is reasonable when
the queried dataset is big enough.
In this paper we consider how to construct privacy channels. Especially, we want to construct
some basic ones, such as the Laplace privacy channel, the Gaussian privacy channel and the expo-
nential privacy channel which should be the respective counterparts of the Laplace mechanism, the
Gaussian mechanism and the exponential mechanism of the differential privacy model. The great
attraction of these basic privacy channels is that by combining them with the composition and
post-processing invariance properties, we can modularly construct other complex privacy channels
as in the differential privacy model. Although there is the great attraction, constructing privacy
channels are challenging works since it is related to evaluate the maximal amount of information of
each individual, called individual channel capacity of the privacy channel, which can be obtained
by an adversary from the query’s output. We stress that the individual channel capacity in general
is hard to be evaluated since it needs to evaluate the capacities of infinitely many channels, which
seems to be intractable.
Our Contribution: The main contribution of this paper is an interesting result which can
transform the problem of evaluating a privacy channel’s individual channel capacity, which is related
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to the problem of evaluating the capacities of an infinite number of channels, into the problem of
evaluating the capacities of a finite number of channels. This result is very useful to utilize the
results in the information theory to construct privacy channels. As some examples, we construct
several useful privacy channels by using it, such as the random response privacy channel, the
exponential privacy channel and the Gaussian privacy channel, which as mentioned above are
respective counterparts of the random response mechanism, the exponential mechanism and the
Gaussian mechanism of the differential privacy model [6].
Outline: The following part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the infor-
mation privacy model and shows that the differential privacy model is a special case of the former.
Section 3 introduces a result which can transform the problem of evaluating the individual channel
capacity to the problem of evaluating the capacities of some channels in the information theory.
In Section 4 we show how to use the result in Section 3 to construct privacy channels, such as
the random response privacy channel and the exponential privacy channel. In Section 5 we extend
the result in Section 3 to the continuous case and then construct the Gaussian privacy channel.
Section 6 give an interesting illustration of the differential privacy mechanism using the probability
transition matrix of privacy channel. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we restate the information privacy model introduced in [23,25]. As mentioned in
Section 1, this model is a variant of Shannon’s information theoretic model of the encryption systems
[24]. As a comparative study, we also show that the differential privacy model is equivalent to a
special kind of the information privacy model, which implies that the two models are compatible
with each other. Most notations of this paper follow the book [26].
2.1 The Information Privacy Model
In the information privacy model there are n ≥ 1 individuals and a dataset has n records, each
of which is the private data of one individual. Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn denote an
adversary’s probabilities/uncertainties to the n records in the queried dataset. Let Xi denote the
record universe of Xi. A dataset x := (x1, . . . , xn) is a sequence of n records, where each xi is an
assignment of Xi and so xi ∈ Xi. Let X =
∏
i∈[n]Xi where [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Let P and Pi denote
the universe of probability distributions over X and Xi, respectively. Let p(x) and p(xi) denote
the probability distribution of X and Xi, respectively. Let ∆ be a subset of P. Furthermore, we
sometimes abuse a capital letter, such as X, to either denote a random variable or denote the
probability distribution which the random variable follows. Then if the probability distribution
of the random variable X is in ∆, we say that X is in ∆, denoted as X ∈ ∆. Moreover, if
X = (XI1 ,XI2) follows the joint probability distribution p(xI1)p(xI2 |xI1) and X ∈ ∆, we denote
p(xI1) ∈ ∆ and p(xI2 |xI1) ∈ ∆.
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Definition 1 (The Knowledge of an Adversary). Let the random vector X := (X1, . . . ,Xn)
denote the uncertainties/probabilities of an adversary to the queried dataset. Then X or its proba-
bility distribution is called the knowledge of the adversary (to the dataset).
In order to achieve more data utility, the information privacy model restricts adversaries’ knowl-
edges. Note that, by letting all adversaries’ knowledges be derived from a subset∆ of P, we achieve a
restriction to adversaries’ knowledges. In this paper we assume that the entropy of each adversary’s
knowledge is not so small, which is formalized as the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let b be a positive constant. Then, for any one adversary’s knowledge X, there
must be X ∈ Pb, where
Pb = {X : H(X) ≥ b} (1)
with H(X) being the entropy of X.
For a query function f over X , let Y = {f(x) : x ∈ X} be its range. Except in Section 5, this
paper assumes that the sets X ,Y both are finite. We now define the privacy channel/mechanism.
Definition 2 (Privacy Channel/Mechanism). To the function f : X → Y, we define a privacy
channel/mechanism, denoted by (X , p(y|x),Y) or p(y|x) for simplicity (when there is no ambiguity),
to be the probability transition matrix p(y|x) that expresses the probability of observing the output
symbol y ∈ Y given that we query the dataset x ∈ X .
To the above privacy channel p(y|x), let Y be its output random variable. We now define
the individual channel capacity which is used to model the largest amount of information of an
individual that an adversary can obtain from the output Y .
Definition 3 (Individual Channel Capacity). To the function f : X → Y and its one privacy
channel p(y|x), we define the individual channel capacity of p(y|x) with respect to ∆ ⊆ P as
C1 = max
i∈[n],X∈∆
I(Xi;Y ), (2)
where X equals (X1, . . . ,Xn) and I(Xi;Y ) is the mutual information between Xi and Y .
The information privacy model protects privacy by restricting the individual channel capacity.
Definition 4 (Information Privacy). To the function f : X → Y, we say that its one privacy
channel p(y|x) satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to ∆ if
C1 ≤ ǫ, (3)
where C1 is the individual channel capacity of p(y|x) with respect to ∆.
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If we set ∆ = Pb and assume that Assumption 1 is true, then letting the channel p(y|x) satisfy
ǫ-information privacy with respect to ∆ will ensure that any adversary can only obtain at most ǫ
bits information of each individual from the output of the channel.
We now define the (utility-privacy) balance function of a privacy channel. This function is used
to express the ability of the privacy channel to preserve the privacy when adversaries’ knowledges
are reduced to Pb from P in order to improve the data utility.
Definition 5 (Balance Function). To the privacy channel p(y|x), let C1, Cb1 be its individual
channel capacities with respect to P,Pb, respectively. To each fixed b, assume there exists a nonneg-
ative constant δ such that
C1 = C
b
1 + δ. (4)
Then we say that the privacy channel is (b, δ)-(utility-privacy) balanced, and that the function
δ = δ(b), b ∈ [0, log |X |] (5)
is the (utility-privacy) balance function of the privacy channel.
The balance function is an increasing function since, when b ≤ b′, there is Pb ⊇ Pb′ , which
implies Cb1 ≥ Cb
′
1 and then δ(b) ≤ δ(b′).
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of Balance Function). Let δ = δ(b) be the balance function of the
privacy channel p(y|x). Then this function is non-decreasing and therefore there is
0 = δ(0) ≤ δ(b) ≤ δ(log |X |) < min
{
b,max
i∈[n]
log |Xi|
}
. (6)
Clearly, the more larger b is means that the more weaker adversaries are, which then implies
the more larger data utility and the more larger δ. Therefore, the parameter b can be considered
as an indicator of the data utility but the parameter δ can be considered as an indicator of the
amount of the private information lost when the data utility has b amount of increment.
Lemma 2 (Theorem 1 in [25]). Let δ = δ(b) be the balance function of the privacy channel
p(y|x). Then the privacy channel p(y|x) satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to Pb if and
only if it satisfies (ǫ+ δ)-information privacy with respect to P.
Lemma 2 shows that, to construct an ǫ-information privacy channel with respect to Pb, we
only need to construct an (ǫ+ δ)-information privacy channel with respect to P, where δ = δ(b) is
the balance function of the channel. However, we find that it is very hard to evaluate the balance
functions of privacy channels, which is left as an open problem. Of course, as explained in [25], even
though we don’t know the balance functions, this doesn’t mean that we can’t use them. Specifically,
we can first set the needed value of δ (but not b), then there must exist a largest b = b′ such that
δ(b′) ≤ δ by the monotonicity of balance functions (even though we can’t find it). Then we can
freely use Lemma 2 to construct ǫ-information privacy channels with respect to Pb′ from the (ǫ+δ)-
information privacy channels with respect to P. The only drawback of this way is that we don’t
know the value of b′ and then can’t estimate the extent of reasonability of Assumption 1 for b = b′.
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2.2 The Differential Privacy Model
We stress that the differential privacy model is compatible with the information privacy model. We
will define a special case of the information privacy models and then show that it is equivalent to
the differential privacy model. We first define the max-mutual information, which is the maximum
of log p(y|x)p(y) . Note that the mutual information I(X;Y ) is the expected value of log
p(y|x)
p(y) .
Definition 6 (Max-Mutual Information [27,28]). The max-mutual information of the random
variables X,Y is defined as
I∞(X;Y ) = max
x∈X ,y∈Y
log
p(y|x)
p(y)
. (7)
Similarly, we can define the max-individual channel capacity.
Definition 7 (Max-Individual Channel Capacity). To the function f : X → Y and its one
privacy channel p(y|x), we define the max-individual channel capacity of p(y|x) with respect to
∆ ⊆ P as
C∞1 = max
i∈[n],X∈∆
I∞(Xi;Y ), (8)
where X = (X1, . . . ,Xn).
We now present the max-information privacy which restricts the max-individual channel capac-
ity, and in which the adversaries’ knowledges are restricted to the independent knowledges to each
records in the queried dataset. We will also give the definition of differential privacy and then show
that they are equivalent to each other.
Definition 8 (Max-Information Privacy). A privacy channel p(y|x) satisfies ǫ-max-information
privacy with respect to Pind if it satisfies
C∞1 ≤ ǫ, (9)
where C∞1 is the max-invididual channel capacity of the privacy channel p(y|x) with respect to Pind,
where
Pind =
{
X ∈ P : p(x) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi),∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
}
, (10)
with X ∼ p(x) and Xi ∼ p(xi). Note that Pind is the universe of X such that X1, . . . ,Xn are
independent to each other.
Definition 9 (Differential Privacy [4,6]). A privacy channel p(y|x) satisfies ǫ-differential pri-
vacy if, for any y ∈ Y and any x, x′ ∈ X with ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 1, there is
log
p(y|x)
p(y|x′) ≤ ǫ. (11)
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The following lemma shows that the above two apparently different definitions, in fact, are
equal.
Proposition 1. The privacy channel p(y|x) satisfies ǫ-max-information privacy with respect to
Pind if and only if it satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Theorem 1 in [23]. ⊓⊔
Proposition 1 has two implications. First, the differential privacy model is founded on the
independence assumption, i.e. founded on the assumption that X ∈ Pind for all possible X, which
is too strong to be satisfied than Assumption 1. Therefore, the information privacy model with
respect to Pb is more reasonable than the differential privacy model. Second, the information privacy
model is compatible with the differential privacy model. This gives us large facility to study the
information privacy model by comparing it with the differential privacy model.
3 From Individual Channel Capacity to Channel Capacity
The preceding section shows that the information privacy model is compatible with the differential
privacy model. Then a natural question is: Are the Laplace channel, the Gaussian channel and
the exponential channel also applicable in the information privacy model? Before answering this
question, we first should be able to evaluate the individual channel capacities of the corresponding
privacy channels, which are new problems both in the data privacy protection and in the information
theory. In this section we will develop approaches to solve these problems.
3.1 A Simple Example
It is very complicated to evaluate the individual channel capacity of a privacy channel. Before given
the general results, a simple example is suitable to explain our ideas.
Example 1. Set X1 = {0, 1, 2}, X2 = {0, 1} and X = X1×X2. The function f : X → Y is defined as
f(x1, x2) =
{
1 x1 = x2
0 otherwise
(12)
for (x1, x2) ∈ X . Then Y = {0, 1}. The probability transition matrix of the privacy channel p(y|x)
is shown in Fig. 1, where (x11, x12, x13) = (0, 1, 2), (x21, x22) = (0, 1) and (y1, y2) = (0, 1).
The individual channel capacity of the privacy channel p(y|x) can be simplified as
C1 = max
i∈[n],X∈P
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Qi
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ), (13)
where Pi denotes the universe of the probability distributions of Xi, and Qi denotes the universe
of the probability transition matrices p(y|xi) such that X ∈ P. Then the main problem becomes to
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p(y2|x11, x22) (y2|p(x12, x22) p(y2|x13, x22)
p(y2|x11, x21) (y2|p(x12, x21) p(y2|x13, x21)
p(y1|x11, x22) (y1|p(x12, x22) p(y1|x13, x22)
p(y1|x11, x21) (y1|p(x12, x21) p(y1|x13, x21)
x1
x2
y
Fig. 1. The probability transition matrix of the privacy channel p(y|x) in Example 1, which is a three-dimensional
matrix
evaluate what is the set Qi. Recall that p(y|xi) =
∑
x(i)
p(y|xi, x(i))p(x(i)|xi) for (y, xi) ∈ Y × Xi,
where (i) = 2 if i = 1 and (i) = 1 if i = 2. We first consider the case of i = 1. There is(
p(y1|x1)
p(y2|x1)
)
=
(
p(y1|x1, x21) p(y1|x1, x22)
p(y2|x1, x21) p(y2|x1, x22)
)(
p(x21|x1)
p(x22|x1)
)
(14)
for x1 ∈ X1 = {x11, x12, x13}. Note that every column vector in the above equation is a probability
distribution. Let A ∈ Q1 and assume
A =
(
p(y1|x11) p(y1|x12) p(y1|x13)
p(y2|x11) p(y2|x12) p(y2|x13)
)
(15)
Then the jth column vector of A is a convex combination of the column vectors of the first matrix
in the right side of the equation (14) when setting x1 = x1j , j = {1, 2, 3}. By combining the
above result with the fact that the first matrix in the right side of the equation (14), when setting
x1 = x1j, is the jth plane, i.e. a two-dimensional matrix, in Fig. 1 that is parallel to the x2-y
plane, we conclude that the jth column vector of the matrix A ∈ Q1 is a convex combination of the
column vectors of the jth plane paralleled to the x2-y plane in Fig. 1. Furthermore, sinceX ∈ P, then
the probability distribution (p(x21|x1), p(x22|x1)) over X2 can be any possible binary distribution,
which implies that the coefficients of the convex combination can be any binary convex coefficients.
Therefore, the set Q1 contains and only contains those matrices A, whose jth column vector is a
convex combination of the column vectors of the jth plane paralleled to the x2-y plane. Specifically,
we have
Q1 = {(X1, p(y|x1),Y) : p(x2|x1) ∈ P}, (16)
where p(x2|x1) ∈ P means there exists X ∈ P such that X ∼ p(x1)p(x2|x1). Similarly, the set Q2
contains and only contains those matrices A, whose jth column vector is a convex combination of
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the column vectors of the jth plane paralleled to the x1-y plane. That is,
Q2 = {(X2, p(y|x2),Y) : p(x1|x2) ∈ P}, (17)
where p(x1|x2) ∈ P means there exists X ∈ P such that X ∼ p(x2)p(x1|x2).
The above discussions tell us that each set Qi is infinite and it is, therefore, not a reasonable
way to evaluate C1 by evaluating the channel capacity of each channel in the sets Qi, i ∈ [n]. Now
we construct a new set Si, which is finite and is a small subset of Qi, and show that it has the
same maximal channel capacity as Qi. Let the subset S1 (S2) of Q1 (Q2) contains and only contains
those matrices whose jth column vector is one column vector of the jth plane paralleled to the x2-y
(x1-y) plane. Formally, set
S1 =
{
(X1, p(y|x1),Y) : p(x2|x1) ∈ Pdg2
}
(18)
= {(X1, p(y|x1),Y) : for each x1 ∈ X1,∃x2 ∈ X2 such that ∀y, p(y|x1) = p(y|x1, x2)} (19)
and
S2 =
{
(X2, p(y|x2),Y) : p(x1|x2) ∈ Pdg1
}
(20)
= {(X2, p(y|x2),Y) : for each x2 ∈ X2,∃x1 ∈ X1 such that ∀y, p(y|x2) = p(y|x1, x2)} , (21)
where Pdg2 is the universe of the probability transition matrix p(x2|x1) whose each column vector
is one degenerate probability distribution over X2, and where Pdg1 is the universe of the probability
transition matrix p(x1|x2) whose each column vector is one degenerate probability distribution over
X1. Then the jth column vector of a matrix in Qi is a convex combination of those jth column
vectors of the matrices in Si. Therefore, we have
C1 = max
i∈[n],X∈P
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Qi
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) (22)
by the convexity of the mutual information in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 (Theorem 2.7.4 in [26]). Let (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y) = p(x)p(y|x). Then the mutual infor-
mation I(X;Y ) is a convex function of p(y|x) for fixed p(x).
3.2 The General Results
Now it’s time to give the generalized version of the results in Section 3.1. Set X(i) =
∏
j 6=iXj, X(i) =
(X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn), and x(i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Let p(y|x) be one privacy
channel of f : X → Y. Then the probability transition matrix of p(y|x) is an (n + 1)-dimensional
matrix, one of whose three-dimensional special case is shown in Fig. 1. By the equation p(y|xi) =
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∑
x(i)
p(y|x1, x(i))p(x(i)|xi), to each xi ∈ Xi = {xi1, . . . , xi|Xi|}, we have

p(y1|xi)
p(y2|xi)
...
p(ym|xi)

 =


p(y1|x(i)1, xi) p(y1|x(i)2, xi) · · · p(y1|x(i)|X(i)|, xi)
p(y2|x(i)1, xi) p(y2|x(i)2, xi) · · · p(y2|x(i)|X(i)|, xi)
...
...
. . .
...
p(ym|x(i)1, xi) p(ym|x(i)2, xi) · · · p(ym|x(i)|X(i)|, xi)




p(x(i)1|xi)
p(x(i)2|xi)
...
p(x(i)|X(i)||xi)

 (23)
which is a generalization of the equation (14), where X(i) = {x(i)1, x(i)2, . . . , x(i)|X(i) |}. Leting A ∈ Qi,
then A is of the following form
A =


p(y1|xi1) p(y1|xi2) · · · p(y1|xi|Xi|)
p(y2|xi1) p(y2|xi2) · · · p(y2|xi|Xi|)
...
...
. . .
...
p(ym|xi1) p(ym|xi2) · · · p(ym|xi|Xi|)

 (24)
which is a generalization of (15). So, the jth column vector of A is a convex combination of the
column vectors of the jth hyperplane paralleled to the x1-. . .-xi−1-xi+1-. . .-xn-y hyperplane.
1 Then
the set Qi contains and only contains those matrices A, whose jth column vector is a convex
combination of the column vectors of the jth hyperplane paralleled to the x1-. . .-xi−1-xi+1-. . .-xn-y
hyperplane. More formally, we have
Qi = {(Xi, p(y|xi),Y) : p(x(i)|xi) ∈ P}, (25)
where p(x(i)|xi) ∈ P means there exists X ∈ P such that X ∼ p(xi)p(x(i)|xi). Similarly, we define
that the set Si contains and only contains those matrix A, whose jth column vector is one column
vector of the jth hyperplane paralleled to the x1-. . .-xi−1-xi+1-. . .-xn-y hyperplane. Formally, we
define
Si =
{
(Xi, p(y|xi),Y) : p(x(i)|xi) ∈ Pdg(i)
}
(26)
=
{
(Xi, p(y|xi),Y) : for each xi,∃x(i) such that ∀y, p(y|xi) = p(y|xi, x(i))
}
, (27)
where Pdg(i) is the universe of the probability transition matrix p(x(i)|xi) whose each column vector
is one degenerate probability distribution over X(i). Combining Lemma 3 with the above results,
we then have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Qi and Si be as shown in (25) and (26), respectively. Then Si ⊆ Qi and each
channel in Qi is one convex combination of the channels in Si. Therefore, there is
C1 = max
i∈[n],X∈P
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Qi
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ), (28)
where C1 is the individual channel capacity of the privacy channel p(y|x) with respect to P.
1 The x1-. . .-xi−1-xi+1-. . .-xn-y hyperplane is the hyperplane extended by the x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn and y
coordinate axises. This hyperplane is the generalization of the x2-y plane in Fig. 1.
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Theorem 1 gives us a way to utilize the results in the information theory to construct privacy
channels. We will show its powerful function in the next section.
4 Some Basic Privacy Channels
In this section we show how to construct privacy channels by using Theorem 1. The key point is to
transplant typical channels in the information theory into the information privacy model to con-
struct privacy channels. Some privacy channels are of special interest as discussed in the beginning
of Section 3, such as the random response channel, the Gaussian channel and the (discrete) expo-
nential channel which are respective counterparts of the random response mechanism, the Gaussian
mechanism and the exponential mechanism of the differential privacy model.
4.1 Binary Symmetric/Randomized Response Privacy Channel
The binary symmetric privacy channel is a generalization of either the binary symmetric channel
in [26, §8.1.4] or the randomized response mechanism in the differential privacy model [6]. Let the
query function f be defined as f : X → Y = {0, 1}, such as the one in Example 1. Then the binary
symmetric privacy channel or the randomized response privacy channel of f is defined as
p(y|x) = (1− p)1−|y−f(x)|p|y−f(x)|, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, (29)
where the output f(x) is complemented with probability p ∈ (0, 1); that is, an error occurs with
probability p and in this condition, a 0 of the value of f(x) is received as a 1 and vice versa.
This privacy channel is the simplest privacy channel; yet it captures most of the complexity of the
general problem.
We now evaluate the individual channel capacity of the binary symmetric privacy channel. By
Theorem 1, we have
C1 =max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) (30)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(
H(Y )−
∑
xi
p(xi)H(Y |X = xi)
)
(31)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(
H(Y )−
∑
xi
p(xi)H(p)
)
(32)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(H(Y )−H(p)) (33)
≤ log 2−H(p) (34)
where (32) follows from that the conditional probability distribution of Y |X = xi is one line parallel
to the y-coordinate axis in Fig. 1 which is just the one in (29), where the last inequality follows
since Y is a binary random variable, and where
H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). (35)
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The key point of the above evaluating is that each channel in the set Si is a binary symmetric
channel in the information theory.
Setting log 2−H(p) ≤ ǫ with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), then H(p) ≥ log 2− ǫ. Therefore, when setting
p ∈ (p∗, 1− p∗), (36)
the binary symmetric privacy channel satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to P, where p∗ is
the solution of the equation
H(p) = log 2− ǫ. (37)
4.2 Data-Independent Privacy Channels
We now consider the data-independent privacy channels [29,30], of which the binary symmetric
privacy channel is one special case. The data-independent privacy channels are very popular and
important in the differential privacy model. For example, the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian
mechanism both are (continuous-case) data-independent privacy channels. Informally speaking, for
a data-independent channel, each probability distribution is constant across Y. The following gives
the definition.
Definition 10 (Data-Independent Privacy Channel). Let p(y|x) be one privacy channel of
the function f : X → Y. For any two datasets x, x′ ∈ X , if the two probability distributions
p(y|x), p(y|x′) over Y are a permutation of each other, then the privacy channel is said to be data-
independent.
Now we estimate the individual channel capacities of the data-independent privacy channels.
Let the privacy channel p(y|x) be data-independent. Then there is
C1 =max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) (38)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(
H(Y )−
∑
xi
p(xi)H(Y |X = xi)
)
(39)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(
H(Y )−
∑
xi
p(xi)H(Z)
)
(40)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(H(Y )−H(Z)) (41)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
H(Y )−H(Z) (42)
≤ log |Y| −H(Z), (43)
where the random variable Z ∼ p(y|x) for a fixed x ∈ X . The same as in Section 4.1, the key
point of the above proof is that each channel in Si is a data-independent channel in the information
theory. Furthermore, in general, the upper bound in (43) is hard to be reached. The following
defined privacy channel, however, is an exception.
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Definition 11 (Weakly Symmetric(-Reachable) Privacy Channel). Let p(y|x) be a data-
independent privacy channel of f : X → Y and let Si be defined as in Section 3.2. Then the privacy
channel is said to be weakly symmetric(-reachable) if there exist one i′ ∈ [n] and one channel
p∗(y|xi′) ∈ Si′ such that
∑
xi′∈Xi′
p∗(y|xi′) is constant for all y ∈ Y.
The weakly symmetric privacy channel can reach the upper bound in (43), whose proof is the
same as [26, Theorem 8.2.1]. We then have the following result.
Corollary 1. Let C1 be the individual channel capacity of the data-independent privacy channel
p(y|x) of f : X → Y with respect to P. Then there is
C1 ≤ log |Y| −H(Z), (44)
where Z ∼ p(y|x) for a fixed x ∈ X . Furthermore, if the privacy channel p(y|x) is weakly symmetric,
then there is
C1 = log |Y| −H(Z), (45)
which is achieved by a uniform distribution on the set Xi′, where i′ is the one in Definition 11.
4.3 (Discrete) Exponential Privacy Channel
The exponential mechanism [31,6] is fundamental in the differential privacy model. Now we con-
struct its counterpart in the information privacy model. Before presenting the channel, we have to
do some preparation.
Definition 12 (Distortion Function [26,32]). A distortion function is a mapping
d : Y × Y → R+, (46)
where R+ is the set of nonnegative real numbers. The distortion d(y, y′) is a measure of the cost of
representing the symbol y by the symbol y′.
For the function f : X → Y, set Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yk}. Then |Y| = k. To each x ∈ X , assume
d(yi1 , f(x)) ≤ d(yi2 , f(x)) ≤ · · · ≤ d(yik , f(x)), (47)
where (i1, i2, . . . , ik) is one permutation of [k]. Then define a function φx on Y as
φx(yij) = j − 1, j ∈ [k]. (48)
Definition 13 ((Discrete) Exponential Privacy Channel). To each x ∈ X , we define
p(y|x) = 1
α
exp
(−φx(y)
N
)
, y ∈ Y, (49)
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where φx is defined as in (48), N is a positive parameter, and
α =
∑
y
exp
(−φx(y)
N
)
=
k−1∑
i=0
exp
(−i
N
)
(50)
is the normalizer. Then the above defined privacy channel p(y|x) is said to be the (discrete) expo-
nential privacy channel with the parameter N .
Note that the exponential privacy channel defined above is a little different from the exponen-
tial mechanism in [31,6]. This is intentioned since we want to let the privacy channel be data-
independent, which is easy to be verified. Let Z ∼ p(y|x) where the probability distribution p(y|x)
is defined in (49). We now evaluate the entropy H(Z) of Z. Recall that k = |Y|. We have
H(Z) = −
∑
y
p(y|x) log p(y|x) = 1
α
∑
y
exp
(−φx(y)
N
)(
φx(y)
N
+ logα
)
(51)
=
1
α
k−1∑
i=0
exp
(−i
N
)(
i
N
+ logα
)
(52)
= log α+
1
α
k−1∑
i=0
exp
(−i
N
)
i
N
(53)
Note that the last expression is related to the two series α,
∑k−1
i=0 exp
(
−i
N
)
i
N . The series α is
geometric and then is evaluated as
α =
1− exp(−k/N)
1− exp(−1/N) . (54)
The second series
∑k−1
i=0 exp
(
−i
N
)
i
N is a bit complicated. Set λ = 1/N . There is
k−1∑
i=0
exp
(−i
N
)
i
N
=λ
(
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ) (i+ 1)−
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ)
)
(55)
=λ
(
exp(λ)
(
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ) i+ k exp(−kλ)
)
−
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ)
)
(56)
=λ
(
exp(λ)
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ) i+ k exp((1− k)λ)− 1− exp(−kλ)
1− exp(−λ)
)
(57)
Then the second series have the value
k−1∑
i=0
exp (−iλ) i =
k exp((1− k)λ)− 1−exp(−kλ)1−exp(−λ)
1− exp(λ) (58)
=k
exp((1− k)λ)
1− exp(λ) −
1− exp(−kλ)
(1− exp(−λ))(1− exp(λ)) (59)
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Therefore,
H(Z) = log α+
1
α
k−1∑
i=0
exp
(−i
N
)
i
N
(60)
= log
1− exp(−kλ)
1− exp(−λ) +
1− exp(−λ)
1− exp(−kλ)λ
(
k
exp((1− k)λ)
1− exp(λ) −
1− exp(−kλ)
(1− exp(−λ))(1 − exp(λ))
)
(61)
= log
1− exp(−kλ)
1− exp(−λ) +
λ
exp(λ)− 1 −
kλ
exp(kλ)− 1 (62)
where k ≥ 1 and λ = 1N ≤ 1.
Let log k −H(Z) ≤ ǫ, which ensures C1 ≤ ǫ by (43). Then
H(Z) = log
1− exp(−kλ)
1− exp(−λ) +
λ
exp(λ)− 1 −
kλ
exp(kλ)− 1 ≥ log k − ǫ. (63)
Using numerical method we can find suitable λ = 1/N or N to satisfy the above inequality, which
then ensures ǫ-information privacy with respect to P of the exponential privacy channel.
5 Continuous Case
In this section we consider the case where Xi, i ∈ [n] are continuous sets. In this setting, Xi and X
are continuous variables. We also let Y and Y be continuous. Then all the related probability dis-
tributions of the above random variables become the corresponding density functions. The entropy
and the mutual information become integrals as defined in [26, §9]; that is,
H(X) = −
∫
x
p(x) log p(x)dx (64)
and
I(Xi;Y ) =
∫
xi,y
p(xi, y) log
p(xi, y)
p(xi)p(y)
dxidy =
∫
xi,y
p(xi)p(y|xi) log p(y|xi)∫
x′i
p(y|x′i)p(x′i)dx′i
dxidy, (65)
where p(y|xi) =
∫
x(i)
p(y|xi, x(i))p(x(i)|xi)dx(i).
The main task of this section is to generalize Theorem 1 to the continuous case. We now define
the sets Qi and Si. Recall that the channel (Xi, p(y|xi),Y) has of the formula
p(y|xi) =
∫
x(i)
p(y|xi, x(i))p(x(i)|xi)dx(i), (xi, y) ∈ (Xi,Y). (66)
Let Qi be the set of all possible above channels; that is, let
Qi =
{
(Xi, p(y|xi),Y) : p(x(i)|xi) ∈ P
}
, (67)
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where p(x(i)|xi) ∈ P means there exists X ∈ P such that X ∼ p(xi)p(x(i)|xi). Let Si be the set
Si =
{
(Xi, p(y|xi),Y) : for each xi,∃x(i) such that ∀y, p(y|xi) = p(y|xi, x(i))
}
. (68)
Then the continuous case generalization of Theorem 1 is shown as follow.
Theorem 2. Assume the individual channel capacity C1 of the privacy channel (X , p(y|x),Y) with
respect to P, defined as
C1 = max
i∈[n],X∈P
I(Xi;Y ) = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Qi
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ), (69)
exists, and let Qi and Si be defined in (67) and (68), respectively. Assume the function p(y|x) is
continuous on Y × X . Then there are Si ⊆ Qi and
C1 = max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ). (70)
The proof of the above theorem needs the continuous case generalization of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Let X,Y both be continuous random variables. Let (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y) = p(x)p(y|x).
Then the mutual information I(X;Y ) is a convex function of p(y|x) for fixed p(x).
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is the same as the one of [26, Theorem 2.7.4]. ⊓⊔
Now we prove Theorem 2.
Proof (of Theorem 2). We first do a simplification. We have
p(y|xi) =
∫
x(i)
p(y|xi, x(i))p(x(i)|xi)dx(i) =
∫
x(i)
p(y|xi, x(i))µxi(dx(i)), (71)
where µxi is the probability measure on X(i) such that
µxi(A) =
∫
x(i)∈A
p(x(i)|xi)dx(i) (72)
for all measurable set A ⊆ X(i). Clearly, there is µxi(X(i)) = 1. Note that the probability measures
µxi in (71) are different for different xi ∈ Xi.
The first claim Si ⊆ Qi is proved as follows. Let p′(y|xi) ∈ Si. Then, to each xi, there exists
xxi(i) ∈ X(i) such that
p′(y|xi) = p(y|xi, xxi(i)) (73)
for all y ∈ Y by (68). In order to prove the first claim, we need to prove that there exists a
probability transition matrix µ = {µxi : xi ∈ Xi} ∈ P such that
(Xi, p(y|xi),Y)µ = (Xi, p′(y|xi),Y), (74)
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where the left side of the equation is the channel when setting the probability transition matrix
p(x(i)|xi) to be µ. This probability transition matrix µ is constructed as the limit of a sequence
of probability transition matrix {µk}k≥1 as follows. Fix xi and k. By (71), set p(x(i)|xi) to be the
simple function [33, Definition 2.3.1]
p(x(i)|xi) = pxik (x(i)) =
{
cxik x(i) ∈ Axik
0 x(i) ∈ Axi1 = X(i) −Axik
(75)
with
∫
x(i)∈X(i)
p(x(i)|xi)dx(i) = cxik µxik (Axik ) = 1, where
Axik = B1/k(x
xi
(i)) =
{
x(i) ∈ X(i) : ‖x(i) − xxi(i)‖2 ≤ 1/k
}
(76)
is the ball with the center xxi(i) and the radius 1/k. Inputting the above probability transition matrix
µk = {µxik : xi ∈ Xi} into (71) and letting k →∞, we have
p(y|xi) = lim
k→∞
∫
x(i)∈A
xi
k
p(y|xi, x(i))cxik µxik (dx(i)) (77)
= lim
k→∞
∫
x(i)∈A
xi
k
p(y|xi, x(i))µxik (dx(i))
µxik (A
xi
k )
(78)
= lim
k→∞
p(y|xi, x¯xi(i)) ∃x¯xi(i) ∈ Axik (79)
=p(y|xi, xxi(i)) (80)
=p′(y|xi), (81)
where (78) is due to µxik (A
xi
k )c
xi
k = 1, (79) is due to the mean value theorem, and (80) is due to the
continuity of the function p(y|x) on Y × X . Since µ = limk→∞ µk ∈ P, we then have p′(y|x) ∈ Qi,
which implies Si ⊆ Qi. The first claim is proved.
The second claim, i.e. the equation (70), is proved as follows. Since the first claim holds, then
we only need to prove
C1 ≤ max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ). (82)
The crux of the following proofs is the observation that an integral of a function is defined as a
limitation of the integrals of a sequence of simple functions [33, §2]. Specifically, the integral in (71)
is a limitation of the integrals of a sequence of simple functions, which will be defined as follows.
Then the inequality (82) should be a corollary of the convexity of mutual information in Lemma
4. To each xi, let
pxikxi
(x(i)) =
kxi∑
j=1
cxij IAxij
(x(i)), x(i) ∈ X(i) (83)
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be a simple function on X(i) as defined in [33, Definition 2.3.1], and assume pxikxi (x(i)) ↑kxi p(y|xi, x(i))
for all x(i) ∈ X(i). Then, to each xi, there is
p(y|xi) = lim
kxi→∞
∫
x(i)
pxikxi
(x(i))µ(dx(i)) = lim
kxi→∞
kxi∑
j=1
cxij µ(A
xi
j ) (84)
by [33, Definition 2.3.2, Definition 2.3.3]. Inputting (84) into (65), we have
I(Xi;Y ) =
∫
xi,y
p(xi) lim
kxi→∞
kxi∑
j=1
cxij µ(A
xi
j ) log
limkxi→∞
∑kxi
j=1 c
xi
j µ(A
xi
j )∫
x′i
limkx′
i
→∞
∑kx′
i
j=1 c
x′i
j µ(A
x′i
j )p(x
′
i)dx
′
i
dxidy (85)
= lim
kxi ,kx′
i
→∞:∀xi,x′i
∫
xi,y
p(xi)
kxi∑
j=1
cxij µ(A
xi
j ) log
∑kxi
j=1 c
xi
j µ(A
xi
j )∫
x′i
∑kx′
i
j=1 c
x′i
j µ(A
x′i
j )p(x
′
i)dx
′
i
dxidy (86)
≤ lim
kxi ,kx′
i
→∞:∀xi,x′i
kxi∑
j=1
µ(Axij )
∫
xi,y
p(xi)c
xi
j log
cxij∫
x′i
c
x′i
j p(x
′
i)dx
′
i
dxidy (87)
≤ lim
kxi→∞:∀xi
max
j∈[kxi ]
∫
xi,y
p(xi)c
xi
j log
cxij∫
x′i
p(x′i)c
x′i
j dx
′
i
dxidy (88)
≤
∫
xi,y
p(xi)p(y|xi, xxi(i)) log
p(y|xi, xxi(i))∫
x′i
p(y|xi, xx
′
i
(i))p(x
′
i)dx
′
i
dxidy (89)
where (87) is due to the convexity of mutual information in Lemma 4, (88) is due to
∑kxi
j=1 µ(A
xi
j ) =
1, and (89) is due to the continuity of the function p(y|x) on Y × X which ensures
lim
kxi→∞:∀xi
cxij = p(y|xi, xxi(i)) (90)
for one xxi(i) ∈ X(i). Therefore, the inequality (82) holds since the channel p(y|xi) = p(y|xi, xxi(i)) in
the right side of (89) is in Si.
The claims are proved. ⊓⊔
5.1 Gaussian Privacy Channel
Now we give the Gaussian privacy channel, which is the counterpart of the Gaussian mechanism of
differential privacy [6, §A]. We will not discuss the Laplace privacy channel, the counterpart of the
Laplace mechanism of differential privacy. The reason why we choose the Gaussian channel instead
of the Laplace channel is that the study of the former is more mature in the information theory.
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Definition 14 (Gaussian Privacy Channel). The privacy channel p(y|x) of the continuous
function f : X → Y is said to be Gaussian with the parameter N if, to each x ∈ X , there is
p(y|x) ∼ N (f(x), N), (91)
where Y ⊆ R.
Now we evaluate the individual channel capacity of the Gaussian privacy channel. The key point
of this evaluating is that each channel p(y|xi) in Si is a Gaussian channel in [26, §10.1]. Note that
the continuity of the function f(x) on X ensures the continuity of the function p(y|x) on Y × X .
Let Y ⊆ [−T, T ] with T > 0. Then Ef(X)2 ≤ T 2 for all X ∈ P and
C1 =max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Qi
max
p(xi)∈Pi
I(Xi;Y ) (92)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
(
H(Y )−
∑
xi
p(xi)H(Y |xi)
)
(93)
=max
i∈[n]
max
p(y|xi)∈Si
max
p(xi)∈Pi
H(Y )−H(Z) (94)
≤1
2
log
(
1 +
T 2
N
)
(95)
where Z ∼ N (0, N), and where (95) is due to [26, §10.1]. Let
1
2
log(1 +
T 2
N
) ≤ ǫ. (96)
Then
N ≥ T
2
exp(2ǫ)− 1 . (97)
Therefore, ifN ≥ T 2exp(2ǫ)−1 , then the Gaussian privacy channel in Definition 14 satisfies ǫ-information
privacy with respect to P.
We stress that the above result is only suitable to the case where f(x) ∈ R. To the multi-
dimensional query function f : X → Rd, we can either use the Gaussian privacy channel in each
dimension of f(x) or construct multi-dimensional Gaussian privacy channel by using the results of
[26, Theorem 9.4.1] and [26, Theorem 9.6.5]. The details are omitted in this paper.
5.2 Basic Utility Analysis
Now we give an intuitive comparison of the data utilities between the Gaussian privacy channel
in Definition 14 and the Gaussian mechanism, the Laplace mechanism in the differential privacy
model. Noting that the variances of the probability distributions in these channels/mechanisms are
crucial to indicate the utility, therefore, we only compare their variances.
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The variances of the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism are respective ∆fǫ and
√
2 ln(1.25/δ′)
∆f
ǫ
, (98)
in which (98) ensures (ǫ, δ′)-differential privacy and ∆f is the global sensitivity. The variance of
the Gaussian privacy channel in Definition 14 is
√
N ≥ T√
exp(2ǫ)− 1 ≈ǫ→0
T√
2ǫ
. (99)
Noticing that ∆ ≤ T for the same ǫ and for the moderate δ′, then the variances of the Laplace
mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism are more smaller than the one of the Gaussian privacy
channel. This implies that the first two mechanisms, in general, have more better utilities than
the Gaussian privacy channel when b = 0. However, if the queried dataset is big enough, i.e. if n
is large enough, which ensures that Assumption 1 is true for a moderately large b and then for a
moderately large δ (in Definition 5), then the variance of the Gaussian privacy channel becomes
√
N ≥ T√
exp(2ǫ+ 2δ)− 1 ≈ǫ+δ→0
T√
2ǫ+ 2δ
. (100)
by Lemma 2. Then in this setting the Gaussian privacy channel may have more smaller variance
than the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism, especially when n is large enough. This
implies that the first channel roughly have more better utility than the last two mechanisms when
n is large enough.
The above discussions indicate that the information privacy model is more flexible than the
differential privacy model and therefore may obtain more better utility than the later when n is
large enough.
6 An Illustration of Differential Privacy
Recall that the differential privacy model can be considered as a special case of the information
privacy model as discussed in Section 2.2. As a by-product, we now use the probability transition
matrix of a privacy channel to illustrate the differentially private mechanisms. This illustration can
be used to explain the approaches introduced in [32] to construct differentially private mechanisms.
6.1 Local Model (n = 1)
The local model [8,6] obtains more and more attentions. In this model, each individual first perturbs
its own data such that the results satisfy ǫ-differential privacy and then submits the results to the
aggregator. This is equivalent to the case that there is only one record in the queried dataset and
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then n = 1. Then the inequalities in Definition 9 can be given a graphical explanation from the
privacy channel’s probability transition matrix

p(y1|x1) p(y1|x2) · · · p(y1|xℓ)
p(y2|x1) p(y2|x2) · · · p(y2|xℓ)
...
...
. . .
...
p(yk|x1) p(yk|x2) · · · p(yk|xℓ)

 (101)
where X = {x1, . . . , xℓ},Y = {y1, . . . , yk}. Specifically, the inequalities in Definition 9 is equivalent
to the constraint that any two elements in each row of the matrix (101) have the ratio ≤ eǫ.
6.2 The Case of n = 2
In this case, we only give an example to explain the results. The general results are shown in Section
6.3. We reuse the function f in Example 1, which is just the case of n = 2. As shown in Fig. 1,
its privacy channel is a three-dimensional matrix. Then the inequalities of differential privacy in
Definition 9 is equivalent to the constraint that any two elements in each line paralleled either to
the x1-coordinate axis or to the x2-coordinate axis in Fig. 1 have the ratio ≤ eǫ.
6.3 The General Result
Let A be the probability transition matrix of the differentially private channel (X , p(y|x),Y). Then
it is an (n + 1)-dimensional matrix and can be shown in an (n+1)-dimensional space as in Fig. 1.
Then the inequalities in Definition 9 is equivalent to the constraint that any two elements in each
line of the matrix A, paralleled to one of the xi-coordinate axis for i ∈ [n], have the ratio ≤ eǫ.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are powerful approaches to transplant the results
of channels in the information theory into the information privacy model to construct privacy
channels. For example, the binary symmetric privacy channel and the Gaussian privacy channel are
constructed by using the channels in the information theory. This implies a promising direction to
construct privacy channels using the channels in the information theory.
The Gaussian privacy channel and the exponential privacy channel can take the role of the
Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism of differential privacy. Specifically, by combining
the above privacy channels with the post-processing invariance property, i.e. the data-processing
inequality, the group privacy property and the composition privacy property [25], we are ready to
modularly construct complicated privacy channels for complicated data processing problems in the
information privacy model.
The utilities comparison of the Gaussian privacy channel of this paper and the Gaussian mecha-
nism, the Laplace mechanism of the differential privacy model gives us a glimpse of the information
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privacy model: The information privacy model roughly is more flexible to obtain more better utility
than the differential privacy model without loss of privacy when the queried dataset is large enough.
How to evaluate the balance functions of privacy channels is a more complicated problem, which
is left as an open problem.
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